Friday, December 29, 2006

Saddam's Execution

Not the topic I intended to start with, but it's the most immediate one. With possibly less than an hour to go to the execution, the favorite topic seems to be: "What's the significance? Will things be better or worse?"

So my prediction: Worse, much worse, and almost immediately. The bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarrah in February 2006 is pointed to as the event that initiated civil war in Iraq. That's not true, of course, but it did greatly accelerate the pace of that civil war. (If you must have a single event to point to for the start of the civil war, the widely-watched fall of Saddam's statue on April 9th, 2003, should suffice. It told everyone in the country that "regime change" had in fact happened.) The execution of Saddam will have a like result as Samarrah, just far more widespread and more severe. I believe that within three months, even the most stalwart of Bush's inner circle (maybe even Barney!) will acknowledge that Saddam's execution was the trigger for the "all out" civil war we will witness.

Why? Because the last pretenses and restraints will be gone. Remember that the only power to coerce lies in power not yet spent. Sunnis will redouble -- or more -- their vengeful violence against Shia and Americans. Shia will respond in kind. Only the Kurds win; why get into the brawl when your enemies are intent on killing each other?

The execution also dooms Bush's long awaited -- and years overdue -- "strategy change." His apparent choice -- more aggressive prosecution of the military side of the war -- was almost certainly a loser regardless. Throwing more American troops into what now will be both a strengthening civil war AND a strengthing insurgency (they ARE different wars!) will be disastrous.

There are only two geopolitical-military strategies that have a chance of working in Iraq, and Bush already has publicly rejected one, and would never willingly accept the other. The lower-likelihood-of-success strategy is to facilitate Iraq's division into three semi-autonomous states, with a central, democratically-elected government whose principal role would be to equitably manage and distribute oil wealth among those three states. The higher-likelihood-of-success strategy is to dissolve the existing but dysfunctional government and replace it with either a king or a dictator (different sides of the same coin) backed by a strong, capable military force formed from ONE of the warring factions. Yes, back to the future. But think about it -- Saddam sat on top of one of the most violent, fractious nations on earth, and held it together. His was a distinctly secular regime in a distinctly non-secular region of the world. He certainly was ruthless, but it didn't hurt that he also was militarily incompetent, so we could kick his butt if he ever got too out of line (read: Kuwait). What Iraq needs, desperately needs, is a benevolent king/dictator -- not a democracy.

That latter strategy was in fact the plan for Iraq as laid out in the 1996 paper, "Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm." If you haven't read that paper yet, you need to. Google it; it's available on many different sites. Be sure you note its authors, and then take the time to find out where the Americans among them were in 2000 through 2003. It will give you a very different idea as to why we went to war in Iraq than anything ever officially stated (even to this day).

Bottom line: Yes, Saddam's execution matters -- especially to the coalition troops that are, as in Vietnam, increasingly paying the price for incompetent national leadership. And it will leave us still further from the "Victory" Bush keeps calling for, but continues to be unable to define.

Happy (?) New Year // D II

Tuesday, October 03, 2006

STARTUP 10/03/2006

Under Construction. If the title intrigues you, please stop back in a few days. I'll try to make sure the content grabs you! // D II